Vietnam is one of the leading countries moving towards universal health coverage (UHC) among developing and emerging countries. This paper examines how utilisation and the supply side have responded to the expansion of health insurance coverage. In the analysis, we use provincial panel data of 2006 to 2012 for every two years, which is constructed from several data sources. The results show that the utilisation has only slightly responded to the expansion of health insurance coverage, and nearly no positive supply-side response has been observed during the expansion. Also, the results of detailed analysis of health workers imply that there has been an unbalanced allocation of health workers between provincial hospitals and commune health stations despite the importance of commune health stations in providing primary healthcare. Our further analysis also reveals that the out-of-pocket (OOP) burden has not decreased and the affordability of healthcare services has not changed in response to health insurance coverage. Based on our findings, we argue that supply-side factors might have constrained utilisation, and that health insurance has hardly eased liquidity constraints. that the utilisation has only slightly responded to the expansion of health insurance coverage, and nearly no positive supply-side response has been observed during the expansion. Also, the results of detailed analysis of health workers imply that there has been an unbalanced allocation of health workers between provincial hospitals and commune health stations despite the importance of commune health stations in providing primary healthcare. Our further analysis also reveals that the out-of-pocket (OOP) burden has not decreased and the affordability of healthcare services has not changed in response to health insurance coverage. Based on our findings, we argue that supply-side factors might have constrained utilisation, and that health insurance has hardly eased liquidity constraints.
Introduction
Achieving universal health coverage (UHC) is one of the most important issues in emerging and developing countries. Among other countries such as Brazil, Chile, China, Mexico, Rwanda, and Thailand, Vietnam has expanded its health coverage through a universal health insurance scheme over the last decade. This paper aims to reveal the overall picture of how health insurance coverage expansion is influencing the utilisation and supply of healthcare services in Vietnam, and addresses what can be done to achieve the goal of UHC proposed by the World Health Organization (WHO) that 'all people have access to healthcare services and do not suffer financial hardship paying for them' (WHO 2010, pp. ix) .
Previous impact evaluations of public health insurance in Vietnam have generally focused on healthcare utilisation and health-related spending of health service seekers among specific beneficiaries, mainly using micro data and employing difference-in-differences (DID) estimation.
Studies estimating the impact on utilisation have shown mixed results. Some claim statistically significant increases in utilisation owing to the introduction of public health insurance such as the report of Wagstaff (2007) , which estimates the impact of the health insurance for the poor, and that of Nguyen (2012) , which focuses on voluntary health insurance, while others show no impact on utilisation such as Wagstaff (2010) and Axelson et al. (2009) , both of whom evaluate the impact of health insurance on the poor. Guindon (2014) finds that different groups of insured people are affected differently as an increase in admissions is observed for the poor and for students, while an increase in the number of outpatients is only seen in children under six. In addition, evaluation results of out-ofpocket (OOP) payments are not consistent. Jowett et al. (2004) focusing on voluntary health insurance, Wagstaff and Pradhan (2005) mostly focusing on formal workers' coverage, and Wagstaff (2010) focusing on health insurance for the poor revealed a significant decrease in the OOP burden. Despite these positive findings, Nguyen (2012) and Axelson et al. (2009) claim that the OOP burden has not decreased for voluntary health insurance or for the poor, respectively. Hence, findings of previous studies are inconclusive, and an overall picture of the impact of health insurance coverage is missing. Also, none of the literature in Vietnam has hitherto explored supplyside responses. Previous studies outside of Vietnam have indeed suggested the importance of supplyside responses to the expansion of health insurance coverage. For instance, according to a study in Thailand by Gruber et al. (2014) , the supply-side factor appears to be critical for access to healthcare and for the amelioration of health problems. Moreover, Kondo and Shigeoka (2013) 's study in Japan suggests that a slow supply-side response to the dramatic increase in demand due to universal health coverage constrains hospital utilisation. Thus, this study uses provincial panel data to look at the general equilibrium effects, which include a shift in the supply of healthcare services as well as the demand for them due to the expansion of health insurance coverage. For analysis, we use a provincial panel data set from 2006 to 2012 for every two years. Provincial panel data has several advantages over micro data in our analysis for achieving the purpose of this study. Firstly, micro data are only available for short-period panel data (two years), and, as in the previous paper, impact evaluation can only be performed among certain types of health insurance groups due to difficulties in identifying control groups. Thus, the results will not be adequate for capturing the overall picture. Secondly, heterogeneity issues that arise in using micro data are difficult to overcome. Although the Vietnamese health insurance scheme is supposed to be compulsory for most people, compulsory does not mean legally enforceable. Hence, there are always unobservable factors affecting enrolment decisions such as worries or uncertainty about illnesses, and these factors are likely to be correlated with outcome variables (e.g., people who worry that they are ill are likely to have health insurance, and are likely to go to hospital). When aggregating data at the provincial level, on the other hand, we can assume that people with these unobservable factors exist randomly across provinces. Hence, aggregating data at the provincial level is beneficial. Also, with the aggregation, we can use provincial data from 2006 to 2012 for every two years, which enables us to control provincial time-invariant unobserved factors with panel estimation.
Our empirical results show small positive effects of public health insurance on admissions and inpatient days, and no effect on outpatient visits in Vietnam. In addition, we also merely observe supply-side responses. Additionally, our further analyses reveal that health insurance is not serving its purpose of reducing the OOP burden and unaffordability of healthcare services. Therefore, liquidity constraints may also be a reason for the only slight increase in utilisation.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 overviews the health insurance scheme and healthcare delivery in the country. Section 3 introduces an analytical model and data. Then, we present the results of analyses followed by discussion. Finally, we conclude this paper with some policy implications.
2．Overview of the health insurance scheme and healthcare service delivery 2.1. Health insurance scheme during our study period Vietnam's public health insurance scheme was started in the early 1990s with a coverage rate of 5 per cent. By 2006, the coverage increased to 56.14 per cent. During our study period, the coverage was expanded to 57.92 per cent in 2008, 61.59 per cent in 2010, and 66.29 per cent in 2012.
As a basic framework, the health insurance scheme has been individual based, and throughout our study period, the scheme includes two groups: the compulsory and the voluntary groups. The compulsory group comprises those who are mandated to have health insurance, yet not everyone in this group has health insurance in practice, and compulsory does not mean legally enforceable.
Differences between the compulsory and the voluntary groups are premiums and co-payment rates such that the economically disadvantaged compulsory group, to whom lower co-payment rates apply, can receive subsidies while the voluntary group, to whom higher co-payment rates apply, receives no subsidies.
There have been various policy changes and modifications to the scheme since its introduction as documented in great detail in the Joint Annual Health Review (published every year since 2007), and this section summarises the policy changes affecting our study period of 2006 to 2012. We focus on the expansion of the coverage target, premiums, and benefit packages as they particularly influence demand-side behaviour.
Expansion of the coverage target
Expansion was achieved through several policy changes. In 2005, small-scale non-state-owned companies (fewer than 10 employees) are included in the health insurance scheme by Decree No. under six years old and the near-poor were included in the compulsory group. In 2010, students and pupils were added to the compulsory group. Since 2010, the government also targeted farmers as well as workers in the sectors of agriculture, forestry, fishery, and salt production to enrol in the health insurance scheme by January 2012.
Premium rates and subsidies
Premium rates and subsidies vary depending on which category each individual belongs to, and several changes were made in our study period. According to the Ministry of Health and Health Partnership Group (2008; , the premium rate for wage earners, pensioners, people receiving social welfare benefit, and stipend receivers was 3 per cent of their income (salary, wage, pension, stipend, 
Shortcomings of benefit packages and their improvement
Despite an effort to increase the benefit, insured people are still suffering catastrophic healthcare expenditure and impoverishment due to illness because patients often face the problem of additional payment for drugs and technologically advanced treatment. The health insurance does not cover medicines outside the drug list and medicines purchased outside hospitals. Also, health insurance benefit does not cover technologically advanced treatment when the cost goes beyond the ceiling. 
Healthcare service delivery
The Law on Health Insurance has entitled patients to receive health services at any healthcare facility without any geographical-and technical-level restrictions. In Vietnam, healthcare has been provided by public institutions; yet, in recent years, the private sector is growing. Public institutions are structured by level from central to local: provincial hospitals (PH) followed by district hospitals (DH) and commune health stations (CHS), and they are intended to cover the whole country. They provide four types of services: curative care, primary health care, preventive medicine, and population and family planning. On the other hand, private health facilities are concentrated in very few economically advanced urban areas, and the services are not covered by public health insurance (Ministry of Health and Health Partnership Group 2013). Because our study focuses on the country's market-wide change in response to the expansion of health insurance coverage, we do not include the private sector in our analysis. 3 In the rest of this section, we provide a summary of the healthcare infrastructure, human resource management, and prices of healthcare.
Healthcare infrastructure
In the initial year of our study period, 
Human resource management: Quantity and quality
By virtue of the government effort, the country has achieved considerable progress in increasing the provider payments, is making price control even more difficult. Thus, since 2008, the government has strongly recommended hospitals to change the payment type from FFS to capitation, particularly for the insured population, to cut down the health costs for the government (Nguyen et al. 2013 ). However, the outcome does not seem to be positive. The Ministry of Health and Health Partnership Group (2013) reported that the capitation currently conducted does not significantly differ from FFS, and the only difference is that hospitals are allowed to retain a surplus up to 20 per cent of the capitation fund. Thus, the problem of overserving of medical treatment has not been resolved.
In addition to official payments, informal payments are a problem. According to Towards Transparency (2011) , the practice of bribery is worsening. In 2010, 29 per cent of urban residents who used health services over the previous 12 months had paid bribes. This is more than double the number who paid bribes in 2007. Although the anti-corruption framework is reported to be strong (Global Integrity 2009), in practice, implementation is lacking and law enforcement is weak (Freedom House 2011). These hidden costs might increase the OOP burden and prevent access to healthcare.
Empirical model and data

Model
For the purpose of estimating the overall demand-side and supply-side responses to the expansion of health insurance coverage, we use the following model in our empirical estimation: ,2010,2012 ( ≥ ) + ∑ * 1 =2008,2010,2012 ( ≥ ) * + + + .
Here, p denotes a province (p = 1,…, 63), and t denotes a time period (t = 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012) .
Outcome variable Y can either be the measure of utilisation of healthcare services, including the logarithm of the number of outpatients, the logarithm of the number of admissions, and the logarithm of inpatient days, or the supply-side outcome variables such as the logarithm of the number of healthcare facilities, the logarithm of the number of beds, and the logarithm of the number of health workers. The logarithm is used to consider non-linearity effects and avoid measurement dependence.
captures the effect of health insurance coverage when this effect in the year 2006 continues into subsequent years as well. To control year effects and (plus) continued effects after year t , we include a set of dummy variables that take 1 for the observation year and onwards (∑ * ,2010,2012 1 ( ≥ )). With the sustained year-trend effects (the observation year and onwards) held constant, we create the interaction terms of health insurance coverage and year-related dummy variables (the observation year and onwards) as described in the model as ∑ * 1 =2008,2010,2012 ( ≥ ) *
. The sum of these terms plus parameter _? captures the effect of health insurance of the particular year and onwards when such an effect of the corresponding year continues into the subsequent year as well. As control variables ( ), the logarithm of the prefectural population and provincial health budget as well as a constant term are included. Finally, in the estimation, we control time-invariant provincial effects ( ) as fixed effects.
. is an error term.
Note that we estimate the movement from one equilibrium point to another. In other words, we do not directly estimate either the elasticity of demand or the supply curve, but we estimate the general equilibrium effects, which may include a shift in the supply of healthcare services as well as demand for them. When healthcare utilisation is considered, we assume that the utilisation is determined by the sensitivity of demand to the expansion of health insurance (decreasing the cost of healthcare). When supply is considered, we assume it is determined by supply-side responses to such demand shifts. 
Health insurance coverage rate
To obtain the health insurance coverage rate, we use VHLSS 2006 VHLSS , 2008 VHLSS , 2010 VHLSS , and 2012 to simply aggregate the data for each province to calculate the percentage of the insured, which includes both those with a free healthcare certificate and those with health insurance. 6 In our data, we are not able to identify different types of insurance due to data limitation.
As shown in Figure 1 , there was about a 10 per cent increase in the average health insurance coverage rate between 2006 and 2012, and a greater coverage increment occurred in the provinces with a lower coverage rate. 5 Because of the length of available data years, it might be difficult to capture the long-term impact. Hence, we run the additional regression using the lagged variable of health insurance coverage. Also, we have included the linear time trend for the sensitivity check. 
Utilisation and supply-side variables of healthcare services
In our analysis, we examine both changes in the utilisation of healthcare services and supply-side responses to the expansion of health insurance coverage. To observe how utilisation has changed, we use the variable of utilisation of healthcare facilities measured by admissions, inpatient days, and outpatient visits. Admissions mean the total number of patients admitted to healthcare facilities as inpatients in each province per calendar year, and inpatient days mean the sum of the days in healthcare facilities amongst all inpatients. The number of outpatients is the total number of patients who visit healthcare facilities for some reason. Table 1 shows the marginal effect of health insurance of the particular year in the top row and onwards when such an effect of the corresponding year continues into the subsequent year as well. 7 Table 2 then presents the result of additional analysis of health workers that divides healthcare facilities into different levels: PH, DH, and CHS.
Estimation Results ─ Demand-side and supply-side responses
8 Table 1 about here   7 As there is a possibility of an endogeneity issue when a provincial health budget is included (more of the provincial health budget might be allocated in areas of lower hospital utilisation), we exclude the health budget variable for the robustness check. Also, for the sensitivity check, we exclude Ho Chi Minh from our analysis because demand and supply patterns in Ho Chi Minh Province are largely different from the other provinces. The results are consistent with the main results provided here. 8 The coefficients of the regression results are shown in Appendix 2.
The results show that the expansion of health insurance increased admissions and inpatient days, although the increase in outpatient visits is not statistically significant. For admissions, there was about a 1.17 per cent increase corresponding to a 1 per cent increase in health insurance coverage in 2012.
As for inpatient days, there was about a 1.09 per cent, 1.43 per cent, and 1.73 per cent increase corresponding to a 1 per cent increase in health insurance coverage in 2008, 2010, and 2012, respectively.
On the other hand, there was nearly no positive response of the supply side. 9 Healthcare facilities showed a slight decreasing trend, and it was statistically significant in 2010 and 2012. 10 The number of beds did not respond to the increase in health insurance coverage. For health workers, we can see a small increase in the total number of doctors responding to the changes in 2012. However, none of the others showed any sign of increase. Medical technicians were even showing a decreasing trend with some statistical significance. In Table 2 , we can see more details. The number of doctors increased in PH, although there was a decreasing trend in CHS. The number of nurses also increased in PH, yet there seems to be no change in DH and CHS. For medical technicians and midwives in terms of statistical significance, there was a slight negative response of the number of medical technicians in DH and the number of midwives in CHS in 2012. As a whole, although some results are significantly different from 0 at the conventional level, the marginal effects are very small implying around 1 per cent changes for most cases. Also, the detailed results of the hospital levels indicate that nurses might have moved to PH from DH or CHS, or that there was unequal distribution between rural and urban areas considering that there were no changes in the total number of nurses as is observed in Table 1 . . These may not have been reflected in the data used as many started their operation in 2011 and 2012, and some more are to be operationalised after our study period. 11 In order to take different qualifications for each profession into consideration, we ran several more regressions by dividing each profession into different types of qualification (results are provided upon request). We do this because the duration of training differs between qualifications. For example, there are doctors and assistant doctors. Doctors are educated for six years, while assistant doctors are educated for three years. For nurses, there are nurses with a degree (four years of education), with junior college/secondary graduation (three years of education), and with elementary training. Midwives and medical technicians also have different levels of qualifications as nurses do. We assume that professionals
Discussion ─ Reasons constraining utilisation
The aim of UHC is to enable all people to have access to healthcare. Nonetheless, our results show only a small increase in the utilisation of healthcare services resulting from the expansion of health insurance coverage in Vietnam. We argue that there are two possible reasons.
First, the supply capacity including the number of healthcare facilities and beds does not respond to the expansion of health insurance coverage. Our estimation results also show a very small increase in the number of health workers where health insurance coverage has expanded. It is possible that doctors have more patients each day, and the slight increase in admissions and inpatient days might reflect these increases in individual capacity. However, there is a limit to the number of patients that doctors can examine each day given the time constraint, and this is probably why the increase in outpatients is not statistically significant.
Second, there is a possibility that health insurance is not preventing a high OOP burden including informal payments. According to Tran et al. (2011) , the number of households in Vietnam that suffer from catastrophic expenditure in healthcare, which is calculated as households in which health-related payments exceed 40 per cent of the household's capacity to pay, is decreasing yet it is still high as it 
12
The estimation models are the same as the main estimation. 13 In the estimation, unaffordability was measured as the percentage of households who answered 'No' to the question 'Could the household afford the medical check/treatment?' In Table 3 , we present the marginal effect of our targeted variables.
14 qualified with a shorter period of training are more likely to respond to the changes that have occurred with the expansion of health insurance coverage since it is quicker for them to be qualified. We used the same estimation models as the main estimation, and ran regressions for four different cases: the provincial total (the sum of PH, DH, and CHS) of each profession with different qualifications, number of each profession with different qualifications for PH, number of each profession with different qualifications for DH, and number of each profession with different qualifications for CHS. Despite our assumption, we did not find any increase in qualification with a shorter period of training such as elementary qualification. Neither did we find any increase in the number of junior college/secondary qualified health workers or assistant doctors. Instead, we found some increase in the number of health workers with qualifications that need a longer training period such as nurses with a degree or doctors. 12 Descriptive statistics are provided in Appendix 1. 13 As a sensitivity check, we ran the regressions without health budget, and without Ho Chi Minh Province for this estimation as well. The results are consistent with the main results provided here. We also ran the regression whereby the controlled linear time trend shows consistent results with the results provided here. The coefficients of the regression results are shown in Appendix 3. 14 Whole results are provided upon request. Table 3 about here   As Table 3 shows, there were no effects of health insurance coverage on OOP and affordability. We can consider several reasons for this result. As reviewed earlier, there has been a shortfall in the health insurance scheme whereby the co-payment rate increased for many insured people in 2009; thus, there should have been some increases in payment since 2009. In addition, the payment method for health insurance and guaranteed autonomy of hospitals has been making price control difficult. Nguyen et al. (2013) even reveal that the shift in payment method to the capitation payment scheme from FFS, which was piloted and has been in practice since 2006, caused discrimination against insured people. This happened because the adjustment of the per capita amount is based on the composition of insured members registered at hospitals, and reimbursement is capped within premium revenues. It created the lowest capitation rate for the poor and children under six due to full subsidisation by the government.
Indeed, these groups are those at the most risk of illnesses and are the most frequent hospital users. unaffordability. In addition to these issues related somewhat to the health insurance scheme, there has also been a problem of informal payments. Indeed, there are even some reports that patients bribe doctors and nurses to secure quicker treatment and to receive adequate attention such as mentioned in Ha (2011) , and the overcrowding problem is becoming more severe in recent years.
Policy implications and conclusion
The purpose of our study is to examine market-wide changes during the expansion of health insurance coverage, and address what measures can be taken to achieve the goal of UHC set by the WHO that 'all people have access to healthcare services and do not suffer financial hardship paying for them' (WHO 2010, pp. ix) . The results of our analysis show that the expansion of health insurance coverage neither increased demand nor eased financial hardship indicating that the goal has not yet been achieved. In fact, guaranteeing financial security is one of the keys to meeting the aim of providing healthcare to all the people. Our findings also imply that supply-side factors are probably constraining the capability of the recent healthcare system.
To overcome the issue of financial protection, the government can intervene by modifying the health insurance scheme such as abolishing the co-payment rate for the poor as well as decreasing the copayment rate for non-poor insured people, and enforcing some strict measures for drug prices and medical treatment fees. Also, it is critical to strengthen anti-corruption enforcement to eradicate the practice of informal payment. In practice, the government has started to make some improvements.
For example, the Health Insurance Law amended in 2014 exempts poor household members or ethnic minorities living in regions facing socio-economic difficulties from medical examination and treatment expenditures at CHS and their inpatient treatment costs at PH and central hospitals. Also, drug price control has been tightened since 2011. Therefore, these efforts should be evaluated to see how efficiently financial protection is provided when people access healthcare services.
In addition to advancing financial protection, it is critical to upgrade the supply capacity. The
Vietnamese government has already taken further steps since the latter years of our study period to increase the supply capacity including establishing and renovating healthcare facilities (Decision No. in supply capacity, it cannot be achieved in the short run. Hence, our result does not imply that the current government policy intervention should be denied. Nevertheless, attention should be paid to our results that there is a possibility that these advancements are not responding to the progress of health insurance coverage. Also, the problem of unequal distribution of health workers needs to be resolved.
While our data did not reflect it, the government policy of rotating doctors between higher-and lowerlevel hospitals (Decision No. 1816/QD-BYT) may be one of the ways to mitigate this issue. Moreover, the quality improvement of health workers should be enhanced with the already-implemented policy of Directive No. 05/CT-BYT aiming to improve healthcare service quality.
In conclusion, the contribution of our paper is that we have provided a more comprehensive picture of demand-side and supply-side responses to the expansion of health insurance coverage. The results indicate that there are no significant market-wide changes owing to insufficient financial protection and supply constraint despite government efforts. Overviewing the policy intervention of the government shows that there have been many policies implemented for better practice of the health insurance scheme and healthcare service delivery. Hence, it is critical to evaluate each policy regarding how effective and efficient the intervention is, and to analyse what needs to be done to improve the means of implementation such as monitoring or incentivising health workers. 
